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Competitors' Lawful
Prices and Lawful Competition
The United States Supreme Court, in its 1951 Standard
Oil opinion, characterized as "lawful" the competitoes
lower price which a seller can meet under section 2(b)
of the Robinson-Patman Act. After examining the pur-
pose, significance and desirability of the Court's use of
the term "lawful," the author of this Note concludes
not only that lawfulness of the competitors price
should not be made a requirement of the section 2(b)
defense, but that an unlawfulness requirement should
be adopted instead.
SE ON 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robin-
son-Patman Act,' makes it unlawful for a seller to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of goods "where the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person," except when
such difference in price is cost justified. - Section 2(b) provides that
a seller charged with price discrimination under section 2(a) may
show that his discriminatory price was granted "in good faith to
meet an equally low price of a competitor." 3
In 1951 the United States Supreme Court, in Standard Oil Co.
v. Federal Trade Comm'~n,4 held that section 2(b) provided a com-
1. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952).
2. Section 2(a) provides in pertinent part that:
It shall be unlawful for any person . .. to discriminate in price between differ-
ent purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality .... where the effect
of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person. . . . Provided, that nothing shall prevent differentials which
make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or
delivery.
Other justifications available are price reductions in perishable and seasonal goods,
distress sales, and closeout sales.
3. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1952):
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that
there has been discrimination in price . .. the burden of rebutting the prima-
facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged
with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown,
the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination:
Provided, however, That nothing contained in ... this title shall prevent a seller
rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price ...
was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. ..
4. 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
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plete defense to a charge of price discrimination.' As a result of this
decision the meeting competition defense attained great stature,
since the other significant defense available-cost justification-
has proved difficult to sustain,6 and consequently most sellers rely on
meeting competition as one, if not the sole, defense against a price
discrimination charge.
The Court, in its opinion in Standard Oil, characterized as 'law-
ful" the competitor's lower price which can be met under the sec-
tion 2(b) proviso.7 This judicial insertion of the word "lawful," its
purpose, significance, and desirability, is the subject of this Note.
One point must be made clear from the outset: the Supreme
Court's use of the term 'lawful" was only dictum; it was not a hold-
ing, nor was it necessary to the holding of the case.8 Furthermore,
the Court has not yet ruled on the question whether the competitor's
price must be lawful in order for the defense to prevail." But the
Court's use of the term has had some important consequences, since
at least one lower court has interpreted it to require that the com-
petitor's price be lawful, 10 and a great deal of comment has been
written on it.
One explanation for the use of the word 'lawful" is that the
Court was merely stating the facts of the Standard Oil case." This
hypothesis is weakened by the fact that no evidence had been in-
troduced regarding the legality of prices offered by Standard's com-
petitors. The FTC had made no findings on the issue, and it was
not before the Court.2 Of course, the Court might have used the
term 'lawful" if it had assumed, in absence of proof on the question,
5. The Commission, prior to the 1951 Standard Oil decision, interpreted section 2(b)
as merely procedural, permitting meeting of competition to be shown in rebuttal of
the prima facie case of violation, but not preventing the FTC from then showing that
there was injury to competition which would prevent reliance on the defense. See
Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263, 281-82 (1945).
6. See Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under the
Robinson-Patman Act, 66 YALE L.J. 1, 21-23 (1956); Note, 66 YALE L.J. 935-36
(1957).
7. 340 U.S. at 238-51.
8. The Court held that section 2(b) provides an absolute defense to a charge of
price discrimination, and referred the case back to the FTC for further findings to
determine whether Standard Oil came within the scope of the defense.
9. The Standard Oil case was again before the Supreme Court in FTC v. Standard
Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1958). The FTC had decided, upon remand of the case in
1951, that Standard had not come within the scope of the defense because it had
employed a pricing system. 49 F.T.C. 925 (1953). The court of appeals reversed, hold-
ing that there was no pricing system involved, and vacated the FTC order. 233 F.2d 649
(7th Cir. 1956). The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the case turned on a
question of fact, the determination of which by the court of appeals was made on a
fair assessment of the record.
10. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956). But see Standard
Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1956).
11. See Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1956).
12. 340 U.S. at 238-40; Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263, 281-82 (1945).
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that the competitors' prices were lawful, although this is doubtful
since lawfulness of the competitors' prices was not relevant to the
Court's decision.
Another, and better, explanation of the Court's use of the term
is that it meant to distinguish the case from FTC v. A. E. Staley
Mfg. Co.13 In that case the seller had attempted to use the meeting
competition defense against the Commissions charge of unlawful
discrimination by adoption of its competitors' basing point system. 4
The rationale of the decision was that the defense could not be
maintained by a seller adopting an illegal system in its entirety,
rather than lowering his price only when necessary to retain cus-
tomers in individual competitive situations.'5 While it is true that the
competitors' prices were illegal, that was not the Court's reason for
finding that the seller could not use the defense. Staley was not
acting in good faith, since many of its discriminatory prices were
not necessary to retain its customers.'8
Although it is inferable from the language in Standard Oil that
the Court intended to make lawfulness a requirement in all cases,
this is highly unlikely.'7 Whatever the Court intended, however, re-
peated assumption, discussion, ratification, and acclamation have
established a de facto lawfulness requirement.'
13. 324 U.S. 746 (1945). In Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956),
the court of appeals stated that:
We do not know, of course, why the Supreme Court added the word lawful,'
but we strongly suspect that it was for the purpose of giving emphasis to its
previous decisions that a 'good faith defense was not available to a seer who had
met an unlawful price.' In this connection, it is also pertinent to note that in
the instant situation there is no finding, no contention and not even a suspicion
but that the competing prices which petitioner met were lawful.
233 F.2d at 653-54. See Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition and Confusion: An-
other Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 YAtz L.J. 929, 967-68, 971 (1951); Morten &
Cotton, Robinson-Patman Act-Anti-Trust or Anti-Consumer?, 37 MnqN. L. RBv. 2-7,
235(1953).
14. A basing point system is a system of pricing in which delivered prices are de-
termined by adding freight charges from a particular location or basing point, re-
gardless of the actual origin of shipment.
15. See 324 U.S. at 758. Subsequent to the 1951 Standard Oil decision the FTC
found that Standard had employed a pricing system, but that finding was reversed by
the court of appeals. See note 9 supra.
16. Respondents have never attempted to establish their own non-discriminatory
price system, and then reduced their price when necessary to meet competition.
Instead they have slavishly followed in the first instance a pricing policy which,
in their case, resulted in systematic discriminations. ... Moreover, there is no
showing that if respondents had charged non-discriminatory prices, they would be
higher in all cases than those now prevailing under their basing point system.
FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 754-55 (1945).
17. The idea that the competitor's price must be lawful did not originate with the
Supreme Court, however. The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act contains
an assertion that the defense was to be limited to cases where the competitor's price
was lawfuL See note 26 infra.
18. Some authorities would make knowledge of the legality of a competitor's price




Under the act the burden of proving facts necessary to sustain
the defense is on the seller charged with discrimination."0 With
the addition of the lawfulness requirement, this burden becomes
nearly impossible to sustain; the seller cannot practicably prove
that his competitor's price was lawfu, 2° since this would entail
proving all the facts necessary to legality. The FTC has recognized
this fact and has therefore modified the burden on the seller so that
he need only show that he neither knew nor should have known
that the competitor's price was unlawful.2 Because of the negative
character of this burden of proof, the seller can do little more to sus-
tain it than to deny that he had such knowledge. 2 Therefore, of
necessity, the burden of coming forward with evidence shifts to the
Commission, which must show both unlawfulness of the competitor's
price and that the seller had knowledge or reason to know of it.
28
Since the FTC probably could not often sustain such a burden, the
result is a virtual negation of the lawfulness requirement.
2 1
ing opinion of Commissioner Carretta in Standard Oil Co., 49 F.T.C. 923, 964 (1953).
The REPORT OF THE ATTOmNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE- TO STUDY TlE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS (1955) [hereinafter referred to as the ATrOuNEY GENERAL'S REPORTr],
recommends that, if revision of section 2(b) were made, a proviso be included as
follows: "Provided, That a seller shall not be deemed to have acted in good faith if ho
knew or had reason to believe that the competitor's price or offer was unlawful." Id. at
184-85. See Carlston, Senate Bill No. 11 and Antitrust Policy, 11 VAND. L. Rztv. 129,
138, at n. 47 (1957). This approach would only make lawfulness a requirement of the
defense without the necessity of expressly so stating.
19. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1952). FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co.,
324 U.S. 746, 758-60 (1945).
20. "Meeting lawful prices, moreover, presupposes prophets, not competitors. Active
competitors' books and price records are not open to each others' inspection. And sell-
ers pricing in the haste and pressure of the market do not request affidavits from their
customers to prove that competitors' price offers were within the law." Rowe, Price
Discrimination, Competition and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman, 60
YALE L.J. 929, 970 (1951).
21. See E. Edelmann & Co., 51 F.T.C. 978, 996-98 (1955); C. E. Niehoff & Co., 51
F.T.C. 1114, 1132-33 (1955).
22. See the almost totally negative evidence offered by the respondent in C. E.
Niehoff & Co., supra note 21, at 1132.
23. ". . . [A] seller should be deemed to have met a lawful price unless he know
or had reason to believe otherwise. . . . While the plaintiff challenging the efficacy
of a tendered 'meeting competition' justification thus should incur the obligation of
questioning the legality of any competitors' prices alleged to be met, the respondent
asserting this affirmative defense - as any other - retains the ultimate burden of estab-
lishing its component elements." ATrORNEY GENERAI's REPORT 182.
24. The burden of proof is apparently the same in private suits for treble damages
as in FTC complaints, although no case has so held. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REI'OaT
181, n.174. But see Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1956), a pri-
vate suit in which the court held that the defendant was not required to prove that
his competitor's price was lawful, apparently on the theory that the Supreme Court
had not made lawfulness a requirement in any case.
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Legal rationale of the lawfulness requirement
The section 2(b) proviso is considered by many authorities to be
a self-defense measure.2 5 Some of these same writers also conclude
that a seller may not in good faith meet a competitor's lower unlaw-
ful price because "one violation of law cannot be permitted to justify
another."26 Of course, this is a venerable and respectable maxim,
except in the case of self-defense. It is equally well-established that
an act otherwise unlawful is permissible when done in justifiable
self-defense, that is, when done to prevent an actual or reasonably
supposed violation of law which would adversely affect the interest
of the actor.2 7 In short, if the section 2(b) proviso is a self-defense
measure, price discrimination should be permitted when the com-
petitor against whom it is used has offered an unlawful price.
Furthermore, the conclusion that it is unlawful to discriminate in
price to meet a competitor's unlawful price does not logically follow
from the premise that one violation of law cannot be permitted to
justify another, unless it is assumed either that all price discrimina-
tions to meet competition are violations of law, an assumption belied
by the section 2(b) proviso as interpreted by the Court in Standard
Oil, or that only price discriminations to meet unlawful prices are
violations of law, a perfect example of question begging. Even if the
maxim that one violation of law cannot be permitted to justify an-
other were applicable, it would not prove what its advocates contend
that it does. It would merely prevent discriminatory pricing from
25. "Congress did not seek by the Robinson-Patman Act either to abolish compe-
tition or so radically to curtail it that a seller would have no substantial right of self-
defense against a price raid by a competitor." Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231,
249-50 (1951). "The right of self-defense against competitive price attacks is as vital
in a competitive economy as the right of self-defense against personal attack." VoODE.Nx
& WmTE, Tn:E BAsING PoINr PROBLEM 139 (TNEC Monograph No. 42,1941). "In ...
[Standard Oil] the Court adopted what is called a 'self-defense' concept of the 'good
faith' proviso of the Robinson-Patnan Act. . . ." Statement by Congressman Patman,
quoted in J. W. BURNs, A-Srtny OF THE ANrcmusT LAws 145 (1958).
26. One violation of law cannot be permitted to justify another. As in any case
of self-defense, while the attack against which the defense is claimed may be
shown in evidence, its competency as a bar depends also upon whether it was a
legal or illegal attack. A discrimination in violation of this bill is in practical effect
a commercial bribe to lure the business of the favored customer away from the
competitor, and if one bribe were permitted to justify another the bill would be
futile to achieve its plainly intended purposes.
80 CONG. REc. 9418 (1936) (remarks of Congressman Utterback). See Note, 44 CEO.
L.J. 461, 473 (1956).
27. PRossEa, TORTS §§ 19, 21 (2d ed. 1955); HARPER & JA.ums, ToRTs §§ 3.11,
3.13 (1956). "In the Standard Oil decision the Supreme Court ...engrafted several
new concepts into the Robinson-Patman Act. For example, it reversed a normal legal
concept concerning self-defense against an illegal attack, making use of the proscribed
weapons legal in attack upon competitors eschewing such weapons." Wallace & Doug-
las, Antitrust Policies and the New Attack on the Federal Trade Commissfon, 19 U.
Cm. L. REv. 684, 720 n.101 (1952).
1958]
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being justified by competitors' unlawful prices; it would not prohibit
such action if justified for some other reason.
However, achievement of logical symmetry in the law does not
appear to be the primary concern of the proponents of the lawfulness
requirement. They contend that if a seller were permitted to dis-
criminate in price to meet a competitor's unlawful price, price dis-
crimination would spread throughout the market 2" and the FTC
would be unable to ferret out the original discriminator, the only
violator.29
Obviously, the limitations placed on price discrimination to meet
competition cannot prevent a seller from initially offering an unlaw-
ful price to all or most of the customers in a market by selling at
discriminatory prices or prices below cost, and, without a lawfulness
requirement, every other seller in the market could discriminate to
meet those prices, provided he did so in good faith. Furthermore,
meeting such prices could result in a greater amount of price dis-
crimination than would have been possible had the unlawful price
not been met. If the seller offering the unlawful price could supply
only a part of the market's needs, and the unlawul price is met in
each case, the seller offering it is able to make an effective offer to
more customers than he could supply. Nevertheless, although spread-
ing is possible in some situations, the seriousness of the problem
seems greatly overstated.
The limitations imposed by the good faith requirement should
allay most of the fears of uncontrollable spread of price discrimina-
tion. A seller lacks the requisite good faith unless he must discrimi-
nate to obtain or retain a customer.8 0 Sellers could offer a lower
discriminatory price only to those customers receiving the unlawful
offer, and only until the unlawful offer were withdrawn either voln-
tarily or as a result of FTC action.
Disregarding for the moment the adverse effects of a lawfulness
requirement on competition at the seller's level - effects which cer-
tainly ought to be considered in devising a rule to effectuate the
policy of the act-spreading of price discrimination via discrimina-
tion to meet unlawful prices appears to be remediable in those situ-
28. See 80 CONG. REc. 9418 (1936) (remarks of Congressman Utterback); Note,
49 Nw. U.L. REV. 261, 272 (1954).
29. See Note, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 261, 272 (1954).
30. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945). See Simon, Price Discrimi-
nation to Meet Competition, 1950 U. ILL. L.F. 575, 589. There has been no decision to
date on the question whether a seller may discriminate to obtain as well as retain a
customer, but, although the Supreme Court in Standard Oil used the word "retain" ex-
clusively, most authorities agree that no distinction should be made. See, e.g., Simon,
Price Discrimination to Meet Competition, 1950 U. ILL. L.F. 575, 588-89; Wallace &
Douglas, Antitrust Policies and the New Attack on the Federal Trade Commission, 19
U. CmI. L. REv. 684, 720 n.101 (1952).
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ations where it presents a problem. One simple way of preventing
extensive spread of serious price discrimination would be to require
the seller, as part of his good faith, to notify the FTC within a speci-
fied time of each instance of price discrimination to meet unlawful
competition, stating the name of the seller offering the allegedly un-
lawful price, and all other facts available to him on which he based
his good faith belief that the price offered was unlawful. With such
information the Commission could take early action to stop the un-
lawful pricing, without which there would be no justification for dis-
crimination by others. Such a requirement would also minimize the
force of the argument that the FTC could not without much difficulty
ferret out the original discriminator, since it could quickly obtain
information which would otherwise take months of investigation to
uncover. Such a proposal would impose very little burden on the
seller discriminating in price to meet unlawful competition.
That the policy of the Robinson-Patman Act is to preserve com-
petition at all levels is evident from the words of the act itself. Sec-
tion 2(a) condemns price discrimination "where the effect of such
discrimination may ... tend ... to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of
them." 31 The lawfulness requirement is inconsistent with this pur-
pose. Many proponents of the rule admit that a seller ought to have
at least as much right to defend himself against unlawful prices as
lawful ones.32 That the lawfulness requirement does not harm com-
petition at the buyer's level, or even that it does some incidental
good, is hardly an adequate test of the effectiveness of the act. If
the act is considered as being intended to preserve competition at
all levels by condemning price discrimination, a different approach
must be taken and the lawfulness requirement must be removed.
The lawfulness requirement seems almost to have been designed
to encourage price discrimination at the sellers level. The seller
faced with stiff but lawful competition may discriminate to meet it,
and the seller who unlawfully discriminates initially is protected
from competition. To prohibit a seller from meeting unlawful com-
petition is to encourage his competitor to grant an unlawful price
31. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952). (Emphasis added.)
32. See, e.g., Simon, Price Discrimination to Meet Competition, 1950 U. IL. L.F.
575, 588.
Where a competitors illegal price is designed to drive the seller out of business, the
meeting of that price to hold customers would seemingly demonstrate, and not
negate, the seller's good faith. Any legal remedy which might be available to the
seller would not only be time consuming and expensive, but might permanently
alienate a customer who has already been lost by the seller's failure to meet the
illegal price concession.
Note, 49 Nw. U.L. BEv. 261, 272 (1954).
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and thus obtain the seller's customers and the concomitant profits
without interference from competition. 3 The competitor might
well believe that the immediate profit to be derived from his un-
lawful acts more than outweighs the risk of loss from any luckless
private suits for treble damages and the relatively mild sting of an
eventual FTC cease and desist order.34
If sellers were permitted to meet unlawful prices, unjustified
price discrimination would be discouraged. Not only would the
competitor offering such a price be subject to FTC and private suits,
but he would also have little chance of profiting by his action. The
industry would become to a considerable extent self-policing.
PROPOSED REQUIREMENT THAT THE COMPETITOR'S
IRICE BE UNLAWFUL
The thesis of the foregoing discussion has been that since the
policy of the act is to preserve competition on all levels and since
the section 2(b) proviso is generally acknowledged to be a self-
defense measure, sellers should be permitted to meet a competitor's
lower unlawful price. Removal of the lawfulness restriction on the
applicability of the section 2(b) defense would, under the Standard
Oil decision, permit price discrimination to meet competition in
nearly all cases .35 The question then is, if the lawfulness requirement
is abandoned, should another restriction on the meeting competition
defense be substituted for it, and, if so, what that restriction ought
to be.
If section 2(b) were simply an application of the usual concept
of self-defense, discrimination should not be permitted against law-
ful prices. But it may be that the meeting competition defense is
justified by more than self-defense principles, or that self-defense
33. While . . . a seller is apparently not in good faith in meeting an admittedly
unlawful price, it should be noted that this gives a competitive advantage to the
seller who is willing to run the risk of violating the law. When one seller chooses to
gain business by admittedly unlawful price discriminations, a good argument can
be made for permitting his competitors to meet that price until the first seller is
stopped from doing so. This is particularly true under the Robinson-Patman Act
where violations are frequent and interpretations of the law differ so widely.
Simon, Price Discrimination to Meet Competition, 1950 U. ILL. L.F. 575, 588.
34. Cease and desist orders, in effect, inform the guilty party that what he has been
doing is illegal, and instruct him not to do it again. Of 19 complaints filed by the FTC
in 1955, 14 resulted in cease and desist orders. See Hearings Before Subcommittee No.
I of the House Select Committee on Small Business, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at
37-45 (1956). Regarding the success of private treble damage suits see 41 MINN. L.
REv. 830, 832 (1957).
35. The good faith requirement would, of course, prevent resort to the defense in
cases of collusive pricing systems or discrimination not necessary to meet competition,
and the meeting rather than beating requirement would prevent discrimination which
undercuts competitors' prices.
334 [Vol. 43:327
as applied to competitive pricing ought to extend to lawful as well
as unlawful prices.
The belief that the meeting competition defense is more than a
self-defense proviso has many disciples, and their arguments for
price discrimination to meet competition generally take either of
two forms. The first argument is, essentially, that the Robinson-
Patman Act is "anti-competition" rather than anti-trust," and that
the only way it can be reconciled with the Sherman Act philosophy
is to permit as much "good faith" price discrimination to meet com-
petition as possible. This argument is based on the assumption that
price discrimination is an integral and indispensable part of com-
petition.3 7 That price discrimination is a natural phenomenon in an
unregulated competitive economy cannot be denied. But as long as
it is unlawful to discriminate except to meet a lower price, competi-
tive discriminatory pricing must be limited to situations where there
is either a lower nondiscriminatory prices8 or a lower unlawful price
to meet. An unlawfulness rule would permit discrimination to meet
the latter, so that only price discrimination to meet nondiscrimina-
tory prices would be prohibited. Price discrimination to meet a
lower nondiscriminatory price cannot promote price competition
either by initiating lower prices or by extending them to customers
who have not already received a lower offer.39 It can only induce
greater competition for a particular customer's business once he has
been offered a lower nondiscriminatory price. The result of this is
likely to be a hesitancy on the part of small sellers to offer lower non-
discriminatory prices, thus discouraging rather than promoting price
competition. Price discrimination in response to lower lawful prices
could promote price competition only if the Robinson-Patman Act
were repealed or the section 2(b) proviso were changed from "good
faith meeting" to "good faith beating" competition. A better alter-
native would seem to be to prohibit discrimination to meet law-
36. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 and authorities cited at n.
15 (1951); J. W. Buras, A Stoy OF =ra ANrrnusT LAws 117-130 (1958); Arrort-
NEY GENEAL's REPOaT 181. But see HAU.aLTON, THE Porics OF Imus-my 147-48
(1957).
37. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249-50 (1951); ArraoEy
GENmr's REPoRT 181; Apsey, Establishing Meeting Competition Defense to Charge
of Price Discrimination Under Robinson-Patman Act, Prac. Law., Feb. 1957, p. 76,
85; Levi, Robinson-Patman Act-Is It in the Public Interest?, A.B.A. Section of
Antitrust Law 60, 65 (1952-1953).
38. By nondiscriminatory price is meant any price not unlawful under section 2(a),
including cost justified prices. Since a lower discriminatory price justified under section
2(b) must of necessity have met another price, it can never establish a lower price by
itself.
39. See McGee, Price Discrimination and Competitive Effects: The Standard Oil
of Indiana Case, 23 U. Cm. L. REv. 398, 464-65 (1956).
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ful prices, so that lower prices would be encouraged rather than
penalized.
The second argument is that nondiscriminatory pricing results in
higher prices and rigid price structures.40 This is supported by the
observation that rigid price structures traditionally are broken down
by discrimination, and by the prediction that sellers would be un-
willing to openly offer a lower price to all their customers for fear of
retaliation. An equally logical explanation of the apparent relation-
ship between rigid prices and absence of price discrimination is that
both are manifestations of weak competition. 41 The collapse of rigid
price structures might better be attributed to increased competition
than to price discrimination. The simple fact that price discrimina-
tion is found only in situations of strong competition, or even that
it is employed in breaking down price structures, does not prove
that inflexible prices must exist in the absence of price discrimination.
But even if it is true that discrimination causes the breakdown of
rigid price structures, this can no longer legally be done, because
in the ordinary situation there would be no lower p rice to meet
with a discriminatory price. The first seller to offer a discriminatory
lower price would be acting unlawfully, inasmuch as he would not
be meeting a lower price. And to argue that sellers would be in-
willing to openly reduce prices, but that they would be willing to do
so with a secret discriminatory price to meet a lower price, is to
conclude that they would rather lose business to the competitors
offering lower prices than to openly reduce prices and risk price cut
retaliation.
Nondiscriminatory pricing would tend to equalize the ability of
all sellers, whether large or small, national or local, to compete on
the basis of efficiency.42 It might also tend to lower prices, because
one seller, by reducing his price, could compel his competitors to
lower their prices in order to meet his, and this in turn would result
in price reductions by still other sellers competing with his com-
petitors.4'
40. See J. W. BxRNs, A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUSr LAws 148 (1958).
41. Evidence that weak competition causes the absence of price discrimination
would in no way, however, lend support to a conclusion that the reverse is also true,
that is, that prohibiting price discrimination would cause weak competition.
42. Price discrimination permits a seller with separated markets to compete with
a more efficient seller. Thus it not only diminishes the importance of efficiency as a
competitive factor between established sellers, but probably more significantly, it
permits established sellers to keep out new competition, even though the new seller
may be more efficient. See HAMILTON, THE POLITICS OF INDUsTRY 147-48 (1957);
Wallace & Douglas, Antitrust Policies and the New Attack on the Federal Trade Com-
mission, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 684, 708-10 (1952); Statement of Alfred E. Kahn, AT-ron-
NEY GENERAL'S REIPORT 186.
43. [I]f the lower price is a response to competition, the higher price reflects
weaker competition, or, as the economist uses the term, some degree of monopoly
[Vol. 43:327
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The remaining question is whether the self-defense concept as
applied to price discrimination should extend both to lawful and
unlawful prices. The usual rule of self-defense is that one is justified
in defending an interest to which harm is threatened only if he
knows or has reason to believe that the party threatening the harm
is acting unlawfully." It is possible, however, that a seller ought
to be permitted to defend himself against lawful prices. But he
s hould not be permitted to employ an otherwise unlawful price in
self-defense unless his legitimate interests would be harmed if he
did not. And a seller could hardly contend that he has a legitimate
interest in protecting himself against harm resulting solely by reason
of the fact that his competitor is able to produce goods more effi-
ciently. The interests of individual sellers would be sufficiently safe-
guarded if they were permitted to discriminate in good faith to
meet unlawful prices, such as unjustified discriminatory prices,
prices below cost,45 or prices designed to injure competition or
create a monopoly.
46
In recent years there have been several attempts, including FTC
interpretations,4 and bills in Congress, 8 to limit the applicability
of the meeting competition defense.4 The efforts of the FTC were
power ... The Committee fears that a company, denied the right to discrimi-
nate, may sell only at the higher price. It is equally possible it may be forced
instead to offer the lower price to all its customers, instead of just to some of them.
The selective price concession, offered to some buyers only, is at best a limited form
of price competition, and not necessarily the best dnd attainable.
Statement of Alfred E. Kahn, ArroRNEY GEERauL's REPorr 186.
44. Authorities cited note 27 supra.
45. 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 1Ma (1952).
46. 26 Stat 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1952); 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §
13a (1952).
47. See notes 5 & 9 supra.
48. S. 11, H.R. 11, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. 11, H.R. 11, H.IL 1840, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). For a concise history of these and companion bills in both
houses, see Patman, For H.R. 11 and S. 11 To Strengthen The Rob!nson-Patman Act
and Amend The Antitrust Law Prohibiting Price Discrimination, 11 VAin. L. REv. 399
n.1 (1958).
49. A few writers, notably Congressman Patman, have vehemently expressed their
disapproval of the present law.
[Standard's] effort . . . was based on the reasoning that it should be permitted to
defend itself from the price action of its small local competitors, even though they
were conducting themselves lawfully. When the full impact of that line of reason-
ing is felt and realized, the average lawyer will be startled by it. It is something
new in the way of an argument for excusing wrongful conduct from the application
of the law. Ordinarily, injurious action is excusable as a matter of self-defense
against unlawful action.
Patman, For H.R. II and S. 11 To Strengthen The Robinson-Patman Act and Amend
The Antitrust Law Prohibiting Price Discrimination, 11 VArN-. L. REV. 399, 415 (1958).
In the Standard Oil case, the Court pointed out that Standard's smaller competi-
tors were engaged in lawful conduct. Therefore, it held that the situation in that
case was different from the situation it found in the Staley case. Indeed, the situa-
tion was different because, in the Standard Oil case, Standards smaller competi-
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frustrated by the Supreme Court's Standard Oil decisions,5 and
congressional action to date has also met with failure. Bills which
would have restricted the meeting competition defense in various
ways and degrees have died in committee.51
An unlawfulness requirement would be preferable to complete
elimination of the defense because it would preserve the seller's
right to use discrimination as a self-defense weapon against unlawful
pricing by competitors. Such a rule would presumably meet with
the approval of those in favor of eliminating or restricting the de-
fense, since their primary criticism of the defense as it now stands
is that it permits discriminatory pricing to meet lawful competition.5
2
Burden of proof
An unlawfulness requrement would present difficulties of admin-
istration similar to those encountered under the lawfulness rule, but
to a lesser degree. For the same reason that under the present rule
the burden of proving that the competitor's price was unlawful has
been, in effect, assumed by the FTC, the burden of proof under the
proposed unlawfulness rule should be on the seller. But, as is the
case under the present rule, 3 he should only have to prove that the
price was unlawful or that he had reason to believe that it was,
whereas the FTC must now show both actual unlawfulness and
knowledge or reason to believe that the price was unlawful.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Note has been to show that the defense in
section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act should be interpreted to
permit a seller to discriminate in price to meet in good faith only a
competitor's lower unlawful price; that is, that an unlawfulness re-
quirement should be substituted for the present lawfulness require-
ment. In addition to permitting injurious price discrimination in
tors were in no conspiracy with Standard to use an unlawful pricing system to the
detriment of the consuming public. They were engaging in lawful conduct only.
They were vigorous competitors of Standard, offering goods and merchandise at
lower, non-discriminatory, lawful prices. Thus, the bitterest pill of all, and one
of the most ironic developments in all of our antitrust history, befell a valiant
effort to arrest the march of monopolistic price discrimination. The Court put the
rubber stamp of approval on Standard's continuation of that monopolistic practice.
Id. at 444. See Wallace & Douglas, Antitrust Policies and the New Attack on the
Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. Cm. L. REV. 684 (1952).
50. See notes 5 & 9 supra.
51. See note 48 supra.
52. Representative Patman sees the evil of the present interpretation of the act in
the fact that the defense is good even though competition or competitors may be
injured. He presumably would not be concerned if the discrimination were aimed solely
against unlawful competition.
53. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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derogation of the public policy of section 2(a) of the act, the pres-
ent interpretation is doubly harmful because it precludes resort to
self-defense, the purported purpose of the proviso, in the only cases
where it is desirable, and it encourages unlawful price discrimina-
tion by shielding the discriminator from competition. Permitting
sellers to justify price discrimination by good faith meeting of com-
petition only if the competitor's price is unlawful would effectuate
the policy of preventing discrimination which is injurious to com-
petition, permit competition on the basis of efficiency rather than
size or geographic dispersion, encourage a general lowering of
prices, and be administratively feasible.

